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Security Analysis, Agency Costs, and UK Firm Characteristics

Author

Listed:
  • Doukas, John A.

    (Stern School of Business)

  • Phillip J. McKnight

    (Cardiff Business School)

  • Christos Pantzalis

    (University of South Florida)

Abstract

This paper assesses the monitoring power of security analysts from the manager-shareholder conflict perspective. Using a sample of UK firms tracked by security analysts, our evidence supports the view that security analysis acts as a monitoring mechanism in reducing agency costs. We also find that security analysts are more effective in reducing agency costs for smaller and more focused firms rather than larger and more diversified firms suggesting that for larger and more complex firms security analysis is less effective. The UK findings suggest that the monitoring role of security analysts is not restricted to the U.S. capital market environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Doukas, John A. & Phillip J. McKnight & Christos Pantzalis, 2002. "Security Analysis, Agency Costs, and UK Firm Characteristics," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 65, Royal Economic Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2002:65
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    Cited by:

    1. Iatridis, George & Kadorinis, George, 2009. "Earnings management and firm financial motives: A financial investigation of UK listed firms," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 164-173, September.
    2. Namazi, Mohammad & Shokrolahi, Ahmad & Sadeghzadeh Maharluie, Mohammad, 2016. "Detecting and ranking cash flow risk factors via artificial neural networks technique," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(5), pages 1801-1806.
    3. Henry, Darren, 2010. "Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance compliance: A private contracting perspective," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 24-46, January.
    4. Fu, Yishu, 2019. "The value of corporate governance: Evidence from the Chinese anti-corruption campaign," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 461-476.
    5. Pieter de Jong & Lakshmi Goel, 2016. "The influence of security analysts on CEO pay cuts," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 13(1), pages 26-52, February.
    6. Rama Prasad Kanungo, 2004. "Security Analysts and Market Reaction:Caveat for Monitoring," Finance 0411039, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Rossi, Fabrizio & Barth, James R. & Cebula, Richard J., 2018. "Do shareholder coalitions affect agency costs? Evidence from Italian-listed companies," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 181-200.
    8. Anh Huu Nguyen & Duong Thuy Doan & Linh Ha Nguyen, 2020. "Corporate Governance and Agency Cost: Empirical Evidence from Vietnam," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(5), pages 1-15, May.
    9. Belghitar, Yacine & Clark, Ephraim, 2015. "Managerial risk incentives and investment related agency costs," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 191-197.
    10. Encarna Guillamón-Saorín & Carlos M. P. Sousa, 2014. "Voluntary Disclosure of Press Releases and the Importance of Timing: A Comparative Study of the UK and Spain," Management International Review, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 71-106, February.
    11. Xu Cheng & Dongmin Kong & Xinwei Zheng & Qi Tang, 2022. "Do foreign investors crowd out sell‐side analysts? Evidence from China," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 57(4), pages 815-834, November.
    12. Iatridis, George, 2010. "International Financial Reporting Standards and the quality of financial statement information," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 193-204, June.
    13. Iatridis, George & Valahi, Styliani, 2010. "Voluntary IAS 1 accounting disclosures prior to official IAS adoption: An empirical investigation of UK firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-14, January.
    14. Davies, J.R. & Hillier, David & McColgan, Patrick, 2005. "Ownership structure, managerial behavior and corporate value," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 645-660, September.
    15. Omar Al Farooque, 2021. "Agency-Linked Risk Management with Ownership and Board Sub-Committee Governance: Evidence from an OECD Economy," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(10), pages 1-16, October.
    16. Chrisostomos Florackis & Aydin Ozkan, 2006. "What Reduces the Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs? Evidence for UK Firms," Discussion Papers 06/03, Department of Economics, University of York.
    17. Hayam Wahba, 2010. "How do institutional shareholders manipulate corporate environmental strategy to protect their equity value? A study of the adoption of ISO 14001 by Egyptian firms," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(8), pages 495-511, December.
    18. Michael Firth & Peter M Y Fung & Oliver M Rui, 2008. "Ownership, governance mechanisms, and agency costs in China’s listed firms," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 9(2), pages 90-101, July.
    19. Pavlopoulos, Athanasios & Magnis, Chris & Iatridis, George Emmanuel, 2017. "Integrated reporting: Is it the last piece of the accounting disclosure puzzle?," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 23-46.
    20. Hassan, Omaima A.G. & Skinner, Frank S., 2016. "Analyst coverage: Does the listing location really matter?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 227-236.
    21. Chrisostomos Florackis & Aydin Ozkan, 2009. "The Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs: An Empirical Investigation Using UK Panel Data," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 15(3), pages 497-528, June.

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