The Dynamic Effects of Educational Accountability
Recent education accountability reforms feature school-level performance targets that condition on prior scores to account for student heterogeneity. Yet doing so introduces potential dynamic distortions to incentives: teachers may be less responsive to the reform today to avoid more onerous future targets--an instance of the so-called `ratchet effect.' Guided by a dynamic model and utilizing rich educational panel data from North Carolina, I exploit school grade span variation to identify any dynamic gaming, finding compelling evidence of ratchet effects. I then directly estimate the structural parameters of the corresponding model, uncovering complementarities between teacher effort and student ability.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics Duke University 213 Social Sciences Building Box 90097 Durham, NC 27708-0097|
Phone: (919) 660-1800
Fax: (919) 684-8974
Web page: http://econ.duke.edu/
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:duk:dukeec:12-09. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Department of Economics Webmaster)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.