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Who would get Gains from EU's Quantity Restraint on Emissions Trading in the Kyoto Protocol?

Author

Listed:
  • Kaino, Y.
  • Saijo, T.
  • Yamato, T.

Abstract

The EU proposal on the quantity restraint of the emissions trading in the Kyoto Protocol aims at reducing the so called hot air that would be generated by the purchase of emissions permits sold by a country whose actual emissions are much lower than the assigned amount. In this paper we show that no quantity restraint of all demanders is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, but quantity restraints with a least one country constitute the equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaino, Y. & Saijo, T. & Yamato, T., 2000. "Who would get Gains from EU's Quantity Restraint on Emissions Trading in the Kyoto Protocol?," ISER Discussion Paper 0493, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0493
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    File URL: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2000/dp0493.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cason, Timothy N. & Plott, Charles R., 1996. "EPA's New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 133-160, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    EXPERIMENTS ; ENVIRONMENT ; NATURAL RESOURCES;

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • Q31 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)

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