Divided Government versus Incumbency Externality Effect: Quasi-Experimental Evidence on Multiple Voting Decisions
This paper explores the interdependency of political institutions from the voter's perspective. Specifically, we are interested in three questions: (1) Does the partisan identity of the local mayor influence the voter's decision in the subsequent town council election?; (2) Does this partisan identity influence in ensuing higher level elections?; and (3) Do voters condition their vote for the mayor on the result of the last council election? We collected a unique data set for Germany in which we link election results for different political institutions at the municipal level. To identify causal effects, we rely on a regression discontinuity design focusing on close election outcomes. We find that the party of the mayor receives a bonus of 4-5 percentage points in vote share in the subsequent town council elections if, and only if, mayoral and council elections are held simultaneously. With regard to higher level elections, we find no effect for the party identity of the mayor on federal and European election outcomes. Using run-off mayor races, which are held shortly after council elections, we show that voters punish parties that performed strongly in the council election. To explain our empirical findings, we explore two mechanisms from the theoretical literature. We conclude that there is evidence both for an incumbency externality effect as well as a preference for divided government effect in opposite directions.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Mohrenstraße 58, D-10117 Berlin|
Web page: http://www.diw.de/en
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Per Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008. "Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 1037-1056, 09.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1121. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bibliothek)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.