Strategically Stable Technological Alliance
There are two conditions that are important to investigate the stability problem when considering the long-term cooperative agreements: the dynamic stability (time consistency), and strategic stability. This paper presents the results based on the profit distribution procedure (PRP), which implement a model of stable cooperation. The paper also shows the relationship between the dynamic and strategic stability of cooperative agreement and the numerical results showing the influence of parameters on the character of participants’ development.
|Length:||9 pages JEL Classification:|
|Date of creation:||Sep 2011|
|Date of revision:|
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- Petrosjan, Leon & Zaccour, Georges, 2003. "Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 381-398, January.
- Zenkevich, Nikolay A. & Petrosjan, Leon A., 2006. "Time-consistency of cooperative solutions," Working Papers 52, Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University.
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