Adoption and diffusion of cost reducing innovations : Cournot competition in duopoly
This note analyses the adoption and diffusion of innovations in a horizontally differentiated Cournot duopoly in which firms have to choose the dates for adopting a cost-reducing new technology like in Reinganum (1981a). We prove that product differentiation crucially matters in the diffusion pattern of the innovation and in the comparison between the adoption timing in the decentralized economy Vs the social optimum .
|Date of creation:||01 Oct 2004|
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Georg Götz, 1999.
"Monopolistic Competition and the Diffusion of New Technology,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(4), pages 679-693, Winter.
- Georg GÖTZ, 1996. "Monopolistic Competition and the Diffusion of New Technology," Vienna Economics Papers vie9610, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1981.
"Market Structure and the Diffusion of New Technology,"
Bell Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 618-624, Autumn.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F., . "Market Structure and the Diffusion of New Technology," Working Papers 360, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F., .
"On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach,"
312, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1981. "On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 395-405, July.
- Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
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