A gibbad-satterthwaite theorem for public good economies
We study the properties of mechanisms for deciding upon the provision of public goods when the feasible set is exogenously given (by financial and/or technological constraints), and individuals' preferences are represented by continuous, increasing and concave utility functions, and we establish a result analog to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: strategy-proof mechanisms are dictatorial. Further, efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms are strongly dictatorial (i.e., maximize the dictator's welfare on the entire feasible set.)
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- Salvador Barbera & Matthew Jackson, 1991. "A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods," Discussion Papers 964, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Barbera, S. & Peleg, B., 1988. "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 91.88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Diego Moreno, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(1), pages 183-197.
- H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
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