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Shareholders’ Voting Power And Block Transaction Premia: An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Companies

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Abstract

According to our pricing framework block transaction premia depend on voting power being transferred through a block relative to voting power enjoyed by the market. Block transaction premia are shown to be correlated with both the block seller's and the block buyer's Shapley- Shubik power indexes in a sample of Italian companies. This is consistent with the notion, first presented by Zwiebel (1995), that private benefits deriving from control of a company are divisible, and that the share of private benefits accruing to each shareholder is proportional to the probability of being pivotal in a controlling coalition.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanna Nicodamo & Alessandro Sembenelli, 1996. "Shareholders’ Voting Power And Block Transaction Premia: An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Companies," CERIS Working Paper 199617, CNR-IRCrES Research Institute on Sustainable Economic Growth - Torino (TO) ITALY - former Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth - Moncalieri (TO) ITALY.
    • Handle: RePEc:csc:cerisp:199617
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barclay, Michael J. & Holderness, Clifford G., 1989. "Private benefits from control of public corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 371-395, December.
    2. Holthausen, Robert W. & Leftwich, Richard W. & Mayers, David, 1987. "The effect of large block transactions on security prices: A cross-sectional analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 237-267, December.
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    4. Zingales, Luigi, 1994. "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 125-148.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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