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Incentive Regulation in Vertically Related Industries : Welfare Effects of Industry Structure and Institutional Coordination

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  • Jorge Andrés Ferrando Yanez

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  • Jorge Andrés Ferrando Yanez, 2002. "Incentive Regulation in Vertically Related Industries : Welfare Effects of Industry Structure and Institutional Coordination," Working Papers 2002-47, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2002-47
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    File URL: http://crest.science/RePEc/wpstorage/2002-47.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard Gilbert and Justine Hastings., 2001. "Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Raising Rivals' Costs," Economics Working Papers E01-302Rev, University of California at Berkeley.
    2. repec:cdl:compol:qt3b7101mj is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Gilbert, Richard & Hastings, Justine, 2001. "Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Raising Rivals' Costs," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3b7101mj, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    5. Epstein, Larry G. & Peters, Michael, 1999. "A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 119-160, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Polemis & Konstantinos Eleftheriou, 2018. "To Regulate Or To Deregulate? The Role Of Downstream Competition In Upstream Monopoly Vertically Linked Markets," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 51-63, January.

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