The Political Economy of the Exchange Rate Mechanism
Since the establishment in 1979 of the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS a number of countries, after entry, have experienced a substantial and persistent rise in their real exchange rate (the ratio of domestic to foreign prices). This paper explains this phenomenon in terms of a `peso problem' of credibility created by the response of a member government to the incentives it faces within the ERM.A country within the ERM that attempts to restrain inflation and avoid economic distortions faces strong pressure from its domestic manufacturing lobby. In the event that trading conditions for manufacturers worsen drastically, they will apply intense pressure not only for subsidy protection but also for a devaluation. When times are good, however, the pressure will be relaxed. This creates an asymmetry in the government's policy reaction: devaluation and subsidy in bad times, and no parity change or subsidy in good times. The result is an average expectation of devaluation in excess of what normally occurs which leads to overvaluation in normal times.
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- Giavazzi, Francesco & Pagano, Marco, 1988.
"The advantage of tying one's hands : EMS discipline and Central Bank credibility,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1055-1075, June.
- Francesco Giavazzi & Marco Pagano, 1991. "The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility," NBER Chapters, in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 303-330 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Giavazzi, Francesco & Pagano, Marco, 1986. "The Advantages of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 135, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Phelps, Edmund S & Taylor, John B, 1977. "Stabilizing Powers of Monetary Policy under Rational Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 163-90, February.
- Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
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