Institutional Traps and Economic Growth
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More about this item
Keywordsgrowth; inequality; institutional quality; political bias;
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-09-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2007-09-09 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2007-09-09 (Positive Political Economics)
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