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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2007.
"A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade,"
Econometric Society, pages 875-884.
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More about this item
Keywordsmenus; non-common priors; speculative trade;
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-01-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CSE-2006-01-29 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-MIC-2006-01-29 (Microeconomics)
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