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Market Fragmentation, Dissimulation, and the Disclosure of Insider Trades

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  • Cespa, Giovanni
  • Colla, Paolo

Abstract

We study insider trading disclosure in a dynamic model where a security is traded in two venues by an insider together with noise traders, and prices are set by competitive dealers in each location, under two alternative information regimes. We first posit that markets are informationally segmented, in that market makers are privy to the information gathered in their venue. In this case, fragmentation has no effect on the price discovery impact of insider trades’ disclosure. We then allow market makers in a given venue to also observe the other venue’s past period price as well as a noisy signal of that venue’s order flow. In this case, we show that if markets are sufficiently pre-trade transparent, disclosure can impair price discovery.

Suggested Citation

  • Cespa, Giovanni & Colla, Paolo, 2016. "Market Fragmentation, Dissimulation, and the Disclosure of Insider Trades," CEPR Discussion Papers 11690, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11690
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fragmentation; Disclosure of insider trades; Dissimulation; Market transparency; Informational efficiency; Price comovement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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