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Domesmtic environmental policy and international cooperation for global commons

Author

Listed:
  • Thierry BRECHET
  • Natali HRITONENKO
  • Yuri YATSENKO

Abstract

The paper analyzes the strategic behavior of several countries engaged in capital accumulation, pollution mitigation, and environmental adaptation in the context of an environmental common good. Both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies are discussed. The non-cooperative strategy is a dynamic game in which each country makes its own environmental decision following the open-loop Nash equilibrium. The cooperative social planner problem assumes an international environmental agreement in force. The non-cooperative and cooperative solutions are compared in the symmetric case of two countries and extended to several identical countries. It is shown that the non- cooperative strategy in multi-country world leads to over-production, over-consumption, over-pollution, and over-adaptation.
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Suggested Citation

  • Thierry BRECHET & Natali HRITONENKO & Yuri YATSENKO, 2016. "Domesmtic environmental policy and international cooperation for global commons," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2781, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2781
    Note: In : Resource and Energy Economics, 44, 183-205, 2016
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    Cited by:

    1. Larisa D. Petrenko, 2021. "Green Trend in Global Energy Development: Tendencies and Opportunities," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 11(5), pages 1-7.
    2. Ingmar Schumacher, 2019. "Climate Policy Must Favour Mitigation Over Adaptation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(4), pages 1519-1531, December.
    3. Gutiérrez-Meave, Raúl & Rosellón, Juan & Sarmiento, Luis, 2021. "The Effect of Changing Marginal-Cost to Physical-Order Dispatch in the Power Sector," RFF Working Paper Series 21-19, Resources for the Future.
    4. Henry Tulkens, 2016. "COP 21 and Economic Theory: Taking Stock," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 126(4), pages 471-486.
    5. Chu Li & Wenjin Shen, 2024. "How to Perceive National Governance Networks in the Global Commons of the Earth’s Surface: A Case Study of the Antarctic," Land, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-20, February.
    6. Pasimeni, Francesco & Ciarli, Tommaso, 2025. "Coalitions for sustainable consumption: Understanding the emergence of shared ownership in an Agent-Based Model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 235(C).
    7. Javier Frutos & Víctor Gatón & Paula M. López-Pérez & Guiomar Martín-Herrán, 2022. "Investment in Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Dynamic Game: A Numerical Investigation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 813-843, September.
    8. Hao Xu & Deqing Tan, 2023. "Optimal Abatement Technology Licensing in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Fixed Fee Versus Royalty," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 905-935, March.
    9. Han, Aiping & Ge, Jianping & Lei, Yalin, 2016. "Vertical vs. horizontal integration: Game analysis for the rare earth industrial integration in China," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 149-159.
    10. Tulkens, Henry, 2016. "COP 21 and Economic Theory: Taking Stock," ET: Economic Theory 236237, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    11. Rohrer, Anna Viktoria & Rubio, Santiago J., 2024. "The strategic role of adaptation in international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    12. Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Nentjes, Andries, 2020. "Pareto-Efficient Solutions for Shared Public Good Provision: Nash Bargaining versus Exchange-Matching-Lindahl," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    13. Natali Hritonenko & Victoria Hritonenko & Yuri Yatsenko, 2020. "Games with Adaptation and Mitigation," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-16, December.

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