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Yardstick competition and political problems

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  • BELLEFLAMME, Paul
  • HINDRIKS, Jean

Abstract

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  • BELLEFLAMME, Paul & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2005. "Yardstick competition and political problems," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1751, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1751
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0297-8
    Note: In : Social Choice and Welfare, 24, 155-169, 2005.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hindriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2009. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 385-397, September.
    2. Kishishita, Daiki & Yamagishi, Atsushi, 2021. "Contagion of populist extremism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    3. Monastiriotis, Vassilis & Zilic, Ivan, 2020. "The economic effects of political disintegration: Lessons from Serbia and Montenegro," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    4. Ivo Bischoff & Frédéric Blaeschke, 2013. "Incentives and Influence Activities in the Public Sector: the Trade-off in Performance Budgeting and Conditional Grants," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201320, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    5. Joanis, Marcelin, 2014. "Shared accountability and partial decentralization in local public good provision," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 28-37.
    6. Caldeira, Emilie, 2012. "Yardstick competition in a federation: Theory and evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 878-897.
    7. Ivo Bischoff & Frédéric Blaeschke, 2012. "Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201212, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    8. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick Competition," Working Papers 2006-15, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
    9. Ruixin Wang & Wendun Wang, 2013. "Dress-up contest: a dark side of fiscal decentralization," Working Papers 2013/30, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    10. Angelino Viceisza, 2007. "An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2007-09, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    11. Bischoff, Ivo, 2008. "Conditional Grants, Grant-Seeking and Welfare when there is Government Failure on the Subordinate Level," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-031, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    12. Geys, Benny & Konrad, Kai A., . "Federalism and optimal allocation across levels of governance," Chapters in Economics,, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    13. Ngo Van Long & Bodhisattva Sengupta, 2008. "Yardstick Competition, Corruption, and Electoral Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 2345, CESifo.
    14. Finken, Jan, 2009. "Yardstick competition in German municipalities," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 09-3, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
    15. Antonis Adam & Manthos Delis & Pantelis Kammas, 2014. "Fiscal decentralization and public sector efficiency: evidence from OECD countries," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 17-49, February.
    16. Tong Yang, 2020. "Effect of agency costs on the optimal matching grant rate in a model of tax competition with benefit spillovers," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 7(1), pages 1-6, December.
    17. Kotsogiannis, Christos & Schwager, Robert, 2008. "Accountability and fiscal equalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2336-2349, December.
    18. Johannes Rincke, 2009. "Yardstick competition and public sector innovation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(3), pages 337-361, June.

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