A note on Kanbur and Keen : transfers to sustain fiscal cooperation
We analyze the two-country model of fiscal competition of Kanbur and Keen (1993) where countries differ in size and use a commodity tax to reach their objective of revenue maximization. Due to fiscal externalities, the non-cooperative outcome is inefficient. Besides, the international optimum could be individually irrational for the smaller country compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the international optimum can be reached and sustained by means of financial transfers between the countries as suggested in another context by Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997). We show that with transfers of a specific form internationally optimal fiscal cooperation is indeed individually rational for both countries and, in that sense, sustainable. Furthermore, we show that these transfers can be such that the optimal outcome is, under some conditions, a dominant strategy for both countries.
|Date of creation:||00 Feb 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993.
"Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-92, September.
- Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, 1991. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size," Working Papers 819, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994.
"The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities,"
886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1995. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," CORE Discussion Papers 1995050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1276, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Sam Bucovetsky & Michael Smart, 2006.
"The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(1), pages 119-144, 01.
- Sam Bucovetsky & Michael Smart, 2002. "The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions," CESifo Working Paper Series 767, CESifo Group Munich.
- Robin W. Boadway & Frank R. Flatters, 1982. "Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(4), pages 613-33, November.
- FIGUIÈRES, Charles & HINDRIKS, Jean & MYLES, Gareth D., .
"Revenue sharing versus expenditure sharing in a federal system,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-1683, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Charles Figuieres & Jean Hindriks & Gareth D. Myles, 2004. "Revenue Sharing versus Expenditure Sharing in a Federal System," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 155-174, 03.
- CURRARINI , Sergio & TULKENS, Henry, . "Stable international agreements on transfrontier pollution with ratification constraints," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1715, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521782760 is not listed on IDEAS
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2004002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.