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Military empowerment and civilian targeting in civil war

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  • Juan F Vargas

Abstract

Civilians constitute a large share of casualties in civil wars across the world. They are targeted to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This maximizes collaboration with the perpetrator and strengthens the support network necessary to consolidate control over contested regions. I develop a model of the magnitude and structure of civilian killings in civil wars involving two armed groups who ght over territorial control. Armies secure compliance through a combination of carrots and sticks. In turn, civilians di¤er from each other in their intrinsic preference towards one group. I explore the e¤ect of the empowerment of one of the groups in the civilian death toll. There are two e¤ects that go in opposite directions. While a direct e¤ect makes the powerful group more lethal, there is an indirect e¤ect by which the number of civilians who align with that group increases, leaving less enemy supporters to kill. I study the conditions under which there is one dominant e¤ect and illustrate the predictions using sub-national longitudinal data for Colombia's civil war.

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  • Juan F Vargas, 2009. "Military empowerment and civilian targeting in civil war," Documentos de Trabajo 5282, Universidad del Rosario.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000092:005282
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mario Chacon & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "When is Democracy an Equilibrium?: Theory and Evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia"," NBER Working Papers 12789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    7. Jean-Paul Azam & Anke Hoeffler, 2002. "Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(4), pages 461-485, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Leopoldo Fergussony Dario Romeroz Juan F. Vargas, 2013. "The environmental impact of civil conflict The deforestation effect of paramilitary expansion in Colombia," Working Papers 201359, Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Economics Program, revised Dec 2013.
    2. Madelyn Hsiao-Rei Hicks & Uih Ran Lee & Ralph Sundberg & Michael Spagat, 2011. "Global Comparison of Warring Groups in 2002–2007: Fatalities from Targeting Civilians vs. Fighting Battles," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(9), pages 1-14, September.
    3. Ahmed Mahmud & Juan Vargas, 2011. "Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 51-74, March.
    4. Uih Ran Lee, 2015. "Hysteresis of targeting civilians in armed conflicts," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, vol. 10(2), pages 31-40, October.
    5. German Orbegozo, 2021. "Consequences of violence against social leaders in Colombia," Documentos CEDE 19320, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    6. Andr�s Castañeda & Juan F. Vargas, 2012. "Sovereign risk and armed conflict: an event-study for colombia," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(2), pages 185-201, April.
    7. Leopoldo Fergusson & Pablo Querubin & Nelson A. Ruiz & Juan F. Vargas, 2021. "The Real Winner's Curse," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 52-68, January.
    8. Juan F. Vargas, 2012. "The persistent Colombian conflict: subnational analysis of the duration of violence," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(2), pages 203-223, April.
    9. Ben A. Oppenheim & Juan F. Vargas & Michael Weintraub, 2011. "The Cost of Fear: Learning How (Not) to Fire a Gun: Combatant Training and Civilian Victimization," HiCN Working Papers 110, Households in Conflict Network.
    10. Blanco Mariana & Vargas Juan F., 2014. "Can SMS Technology Improve Low Take-up of Social Benefits?," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 61-81, January.
    11. Melissa Rubio-Ramos, 2022. "Trust, Violence, and Coca," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 176, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

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