Game-Theoretic Interpretations of Commitment
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- Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000.
"Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated". "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
- Klein, Daniel B. & O'Flaherty, Brendan, 1993. "A game-theoretic rendering of promises and threats," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 295-314, August.
- Klein, D.B., 1991. "A Game-Theoretic rendering of Promises and Threats," Papers 90-91-21, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Hirshleifer,Jack & Glazer,Amihai & Hirshleifer,David, 2005. "Price Theory and Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521523424, December.
- Baik, Kyung H & Shogren, Jason F, 1992. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 359-362, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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