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A Pure Theory of Strategic Behavior and Social Institutions

Author

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  • Earl A. Thompson

    (UCLA)

  • Roger L. Faith

    (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Earl A. Thompson & Roger L. Faith, 1980. "A Pure Theory of Strategic Behavior and Social Institutions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 154, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:154
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp154.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Reinhard Selten, 1974. "The Chain Store Paradox," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 018, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Earl A. Thompson & Wayne E. Ruhter, 1979. "Parental Malincentives and Social Legislation," UCLA Economics Working Papers 141, UCLA Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Earl A. Thompson & Roger L. Faith, 1980. "Social Interaction Under Truly Perfect Information," UCLA Economics Working Papers 175, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1990. "Games Real Actors Could Play: The Problem of Connectedness," MPIfG Discussion Paper 90/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

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