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Partisan Politics and Aggregation Failure with Ignorant Voters

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  • Faruk Gul
  • Wolfgang Pesendorfer

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  • Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2006. "Partisan Politics and Aggregation Failure with Ignorant Voters," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000828, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000000828
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    1. Bernhardt, Dan & Duggan, John & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-29, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sourav Bhattacharya, 2006. "Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections," Working Paper 325, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Dec 2008.
    2. Canegrati, Emanuele, 2006. "Political Bad Reputation," MPRA Paper 1018, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Stefan Krasa & Mattias Polborn, 2007. "Majority-efficiency and Competition-efficiency in a Binary Policy Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 1958, CESifo.

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