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Certification Strategies, Industrial Development and a Global Market for Biofuels

Author

Listed:
  • Ricardo Hausmann

    (Harvard's Growth Lab)

  • Rodrigo Wagner

Abstract

A disproportionately large amount of the world's agronomic potential for the production of bio-ethanol is concentrated in a subset of developing countries. To develop that potential, countries need both the existence of an appropriate local business ecosystem and reliable global demand. The creation of a global market for green biofuels, however, is affected by a constellation of diverse and sometimes conflicting policy goals, which tend to complicate policy discussion. In this paper we compile a set of principles to guide the design of a global market for green biofuels.

Suggested Citation

  • Ricardo Hausmann & Rodrigo Wagner, 2009. "Certification Strategies, Industrial Development and a Global Market for Biofuels," CID Working Papers 192, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cid:wpfacu:192
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    File URL: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cid/files/publications/faculty-working-papers/192.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Elisa Portale, 2012. "Socio-Economic Sustainability of Biofuel Production in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from a Jatropha Outgrower Model in Rural Tanzania," CID Working Papers 56, Center for International Development at Harvard University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market Design; Bio-Energy; Ethanol; Sugarcane;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment

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