Majority Lost: Global Evidence and Field Experiments on Electoral Miscoordination
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- K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
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More about this item
Keywords
; ; ;JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K16 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Election Law
- P17 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Performance and Prospects
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2026-08-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2026-08-17 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2026-08-17 (Positive Political Economics)
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