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Rationalizations and Political Polarization

Author

Listed:
  • Yves Le Yaouanq
  • Peter Schwardmann
  • Joël J. van der Weele
  • Yves Le Yaouanq

Abstract

We present a self- and social-signaling model formalizing findings in political psychology that moral and political judgments stem primarily from intuition and emotion, while reasoning serves to rationalize these intuitions to maintain an image of impartiality. In social interactions, agents’ rationalizations are strategic complements: others’ rationalizations weaken their ability to judge critically and make their actions less revealing of (inconvenient) truths. When agents are naive about their own rationalizations, our model predicts ideological and affective polarization, with each side assigning inappropriate motives to the other. Cross-partisan exchanges of narratives reduce polarization but are avoided by the agents. In within-group exchanges agents favor skilled speakers, whose narratives worsen polarization. Our model explains partisan disagreements over policy consequences, aligns with empirical polarization trends, and offers insights into efforts to disrupt echo chambers.

Suggested Citation

  • Yves Le Yaouanq & Peter Schwardmann & Joël J. van der Weele & Yves Le Yaouanq, 2025. "Rationalizations and Political Polarization," CESifo Working Paper Series 11897, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11897
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    File URL: https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp11897.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    esteem; moral behavior; self-deception; group decisions; polarization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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