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Under Pressure? Performance Evaluation of Police Officers as an Incentive to Cheat: Evidence from Drug Crimes in Russia

Author

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  • Ekaterina Travova

Abstract

This paper provides an empirical analysis of possible manipulations of amounts of seized drugs, based on a unique dataset that contains full information on drug crimes in Russia reported during 2013-2014. First, using a standard bunching estimator, I investigate the incentives for police officers to manipulate and find that the motivation most likely arises from the officers’ performance evaluation system. Second, applying a novel bunching technique, I determine that police officers are more likely to manipulate the drug amounts seized from repeat offenders. The overall effect of manipulation is an additional year of incarceration, and this is not dependent on a guilty plea.

Suggested Citation

  • Ekaterina Travova, 2019. "Under Pressure? Performance Evaluation of Police Officers as an Incentive to Cheat: Evidence from Drug Crimes in Russia," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp637, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    • Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp637
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    File URL: http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp637.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Jakub Drapal & Michal Soltes, 2021. "Sentencing Decisions Around Quantity Thresholds: Theory and Experiment," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp715, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    2. Lepage, Louis-Pierre, 2020. "Are criminals strategic? Offender responses to drug sentencing cutoffs," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    drug crimes; police discretion; performance evaluation; incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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