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Especificidad de activos y organización empresaria: el caso de los contratos de construcción de obras

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Dutto
  • Marcos Gallacher

Abstract

El objetivo de este trabajo es describir mecanismos incorporados en los contratos de construcción de obras que sirven para disminuir los costos de transacción. Se analizan las soluciones a los problemas contractuales propios de esta actividad, en particular a aquellos originados en la especificidad de los activos y en la racionalidad limitada. Los conceptos teóricos empleados se utilizan para comprender la lógica económica de un caso real de contratación de obra pública.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Dutto & Marcos Gallacher, 2011. "Especificidad de activos y organización empresaria: el caso de los contratos de construcción de obras," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 445, Universidad del CEMA.
    • Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:445
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    File URL: https://www.ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/445.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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