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Market Power and Windfall Profits in Emission Permit Markets

Author

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  • Beat Hintermann

    () (Center for Energy Policy and Economics CEPE, Department of Management, Technology and Economics, ETH Zurich, Switzerland)

Abstract

Although market power in permit markets has been examined in some detail following the seminal work of Hahn (1984), the effect of free allocation on price manipulation with market power in both output and permit market has not specifically been addressed. I show that in this case, the threshold for free allocation above which dominant firms will increase the permit price is below their emissions. In addition to being of general economic interest, this issue is relevant in the context of the EUETS. I find that European power generators received free allowances in excess of the derived threshold.

Suggested Citation

  • Beat Hintermann, 2009. "Market Power and Windfall Profits in Emission Permit Markets," CEPE Working paper series 09-62, CEPE Center for Energy Policy and Economics, ETH Zurich.
  • Handle: RePEc:cee:wpcepe:09-62
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    File URL: http://www.cepe.ethz.ch/publications/workingPapers/CEPE_WP62.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Johann Wackerbauer & Jutta Albrecht-Saavedra & Marc Gronwald & Janina Ketterer & Jana Lippelt & Johannes Pfeiffer & Luise Röpke & Markus Zimmer, 2011. "Bewertung der klimapolitischen Maßnahmen und Instrumente: eine Studie im Auftrag der E.ON AG," ifo Forschungsberichte, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 51, October.
    2. Corinne Chaton & Anna Créti & Benoit Peluchon, 2013. "Banking and backloading emission permits," Working Papers hal-00915944, HAL.
    3. Chaton, Corinne & Creti, Anna & Peluchon, Benoît, 2015. "Banking and back-loading emission permits," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 332-341.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market power; emissions permit markets; air pollution; EU ETS; CO2; electricity generation; permit allocation; windfall profits; cost pass-through;

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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