A bargaining model for finite n-person multi-criteria games
In this paper we consider a multi-criteria game model which allows interactions between players. The problem addressed is considered as a cooperative game in order to achieve consensus solutions which are evaluated with respect to several criteria simultaneously. The main idea consists of analyzing finite multi-criteria n-person games as multi-criteria bargaining games. The notion of Pareto-optimal guaranteed payoffs as a generalization of the maximin values of scalar games is proposed, together with two different solution concepts which can be characterized as the solutions of multi-criteria linear programming problems. A procedure to incorporate additional information about the agents' preferences in order to reach a final consensus is also provided.
|Date of creation:||2005|
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- Borm, Peter & Vermeulen, Dries & Voorneveld, Mark, 2003.
"The structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games,"
European Journal of Operational Research,
Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 480-493, August.
- Borm, P.E.M. & Vermeulen, D. & Voorneveld, M., 1998. "The Structure of the Set of Equilibria for Two Person Multicriteria Games," Discussion Paper 1998-75, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Borm, P.E.M. & Vermeulen, D. & Voorneveld, M., 2003. "The structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games," Other publications TiSEM ecf9e80b-f56a-4669-b647-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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- Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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