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A Continuous Dilemma ∗

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  • Friedman, Daniel
  • Oprea, Ryan

Abstract

We study prisoner’s dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation rises to 90% or more. Control sessions with 8-time repeated matchings achieve less than half as much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in one-shot control sessions. In follow-up sessions with a variable number of subperiods, cooperation rates increase nearly linearly as the grid size decreases and, with one-second subperiods, they approach the level seen in continuous sessions. Our data support a strand of theory that explains how the capacity to respond rapidly stabilizes cooperation and destabilizes defection in the prisoner’s dilemma.

Suggested Citation

  • Friedman, Daniel & Oprea, Ryan, 2009. "A Continuous Dilemma ∗," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3475m3dq, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt3475m3dq
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    4. Pedro Dal Bo & Guillaume R. Frechette, 2007. "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2007-7, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    5. Bergin, James & MacLeod, W Bentley, 1993. "Continuous Time Repeated Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(1), pages 21-37, February.
    6. Pedro Dal BÛ, 2002. "Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," Working Papers 2002-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    7. Esther Hauk & Rosemarie Nagel, 2000. "Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers 487, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    8. Pedro Dal Bó, 2005. "Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1591-1604, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2012. "Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 35-52.

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