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Legal diversity and regulatory competition: which model for Europe?

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  • Simon Deakin

Abstract

Two models of regulatory competition are contrasted, one based on a US pattern of Ôcompetitive federalismÕ, the other a European conception of Ôreflexive harmonisationÕ. In the European context, harmonization of corporate and labour law, contrary to its critics, has been a force for the preservation of diversity, and of an approach to regulatory interaction based on mutual learning between nation states. It is thus paradoxical, and arguably antithetical to the goal of European integration, that this approach is in danger of being undermined by attempts, following the Centros case, to introduce a Delaware-type form of inter-jurisdictional competition into European company law.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Deakin, 2006. "Legal diversity and regulatory competition: which model for Europe?," Working Papers wp323, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp323 Note: PRO-2
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    File URL: https://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/working-papers/wp323.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Cohen, Alma, 2005. "The costs of entrenched boards," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, pages 409-433.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bruce G. Carruthers & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, 2016. "Regulatory Races: The Effects of Jurisdictional Competition on Regulatory Standards," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 52-97.
    2. Eckey, Hans-Friedrich & Türck, Matthias, 2007. "Convergence of EU-Regions. A Literature Report," INVESTIGACIONES REGIONALES - Journal of REGIONAL RESEARCH, Asociación Española de Ciencia Regional, issue 10, pages 5-32.
    3. Mathias Siems, 2009. "Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection: Time Series Evidence about the Differences between French, German, Idian, UK and US Law," Working Papers wp381, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate law; labour law; regulatory competition;

    JEL classification:

    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law

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