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Matching and Information Design in Marketplaces

Author

Listed:
  • Elliott, M.
  • Galeotti, A.
  • Koh, A.
  • Li, W.

Abstract

There are many markets that are networked in these sense that not all consumers have access to (or are aware of) all products, while, at the same time, firms have some information about consumers and can distinguish some consumers from some others (for example, in online markets through cookies). With unit demand and price-setting firms we give a complete characterization of all welfare outcomes achievable in equilibrium (for arbitrary buyer-seller networks and arbitrary information structures), as well as the designs (networks and information structures) which implement them.

Suggested Citation

  • Elliott, M. & Galeotti, A. & Koh, A. & Li, W., 2023. "Matching and Information Design in Marketplaces," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2313, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:2313
    Note: mle30
    as

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    File URL: https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe2313.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2016. "Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2019. "Markets for Information: An Introduction," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 85-107, August.
    3. Anne-Katrin Roesler & Balázs Szentes, 2017. "Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 2072-2080, July.
    4. Mark Armstrong & Jidong Zhou, 2022. "Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 534-577, February.
    5. Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2011. "Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(1), pages 235-262.
    6. Mihai Manea, 2011. "Bargaining in Stationary Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 2042-2080, August.
    7. Andrei Hagiu & Bruno Jullien, 2011. "Why do intermediaries divert search?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(2), pages 337-362, June.
    8. Matthew Elliott, 2015. "Inefficiencies in Networked Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 43-82, November.
    9. Daniele Condorelli & Balázs Szentes, 2020. "Information Design in the Holdup Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 681-709.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Emir Kamenica & Xiao Lin, 2024. "Commitment and Randomization in Communication," PIER Working Paper Archive 24-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Emir Kamenica & Xiao Lin, 2024. "Commitment and Randomization in Communication," Papers 2410.17503, arXiv.org.

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