IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Incumbency Effects in Brazilian Mayoral Elections: A Regression Discontinuity Design

  • Leandro De Magalhães


Registered author(s):

    I use a regression discontinuity design to study incumbency effects in Brazilian mayoral elections. For mayors elected in 1996 I find no evidence of an incumbency effect on the probability of being elected in 2000. For the 2000-2004 electoral cycle I also find no effect except for races where the mayor elected in 2000 belonged to the a party in the center-right coalition and the runner-up belonged to a party in the center-left coalition. In these races I find an incumbency disadvantage. For mayors elected in 2004 I find a strong incumbency advantage in the 2008 election across all races. I also show some novel incumbency effects. Winning a mayoral election does not have a positive effect on the future prospects of a politician’s career at the state, national or local level. Losing a mayoral election increases the probability of a politician switching parties.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK in its series The Centre for Market and Public Organisation with number 12/284.

    in new window

    Length: 36 pages
    Date of creation: Feb 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bri:cmpowp:12/284
    Contact details of provider: Postal: 2 Priory Road, Bristol, BS8 1TX
    Phone: 0117 33 10799
    Fax: 0117 33 10705
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux, 2010. "Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(2), pages 281-355, June.
    2. Sakurai, Sergio N. & Menezes, Naercio A., 2008. "Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities," Insper Working Papers wpe_117, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    3. Fernanda Brollo & Tommaso Nannicini & Roberto Perotti & Guido Tabellini, 2010. "The Political Resource Curse," NBER Working Papers 15705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2009. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments," NBER Working Papers 14937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Lee, David S., 2008. "Randomized experiments from non-random selection in U.S. House elections," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 675-697, February.
    6. Cox, Gary W. & Katz, Jonathan N., 1995. "Why Did The Incumbency Advantage In U.S. House Elections Grow?," Working Papers 939, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    7. Uppal, Yogesh, 2007. "The Disadvantaged Incumbents: Estimating Incumbency Effects in Indian State Legislatures," MPRA Paper 8515, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Ferraz, Claudio & Finan, Frederico S., 2007. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 2836, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Brollo, Fernanda & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2011. "Tying Your Enemy’s Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil," IZA Discussion Papers 5698, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    10. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:124:y:2009:i:1:p:399-422 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bri:cmpowp:12/284. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.