IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bon/boncrc/crctr224_2019_083.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Revenue Management Without Commitment: Dynamic Pricing and Periodic Flash Sales

Author

Listed:
  • Francesc Dilmé
  • Fei Li

Abstract

A seller has a fixed number of goods to sell by a deadline. At each time, he posts a regular price and decides whether to hold a flash sale. Over time, buyers privately enter the market and strategically time their purchases. If a buyer does not purchase when she arrives, she can pay an attention cost to recheck the regular price afterwards, or she can wait for future flash sales where she may obtain a good at a discounted price. In the unique Markov perfect equilibrium, the seller sporadically holds flash sales to lower the stock of goods. A flash sale increases the willingness to pay of future buyers, but decreases the willingness to pay of buyers who arrive early in the game. When it is very likely that a buyer will obtain a good in a flash sale, the seller holds a 'big' initial flash sale for all but one unit of the good.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesc Dilmé & Fei Li, 2019. "Revenue Management Without Commitment: Dynamic Pricing and Periodic Flash Sales," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_083, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2019_083
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp083
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2021. "Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 310-328.
    2. Zhang, Hanzhe, 2021. "The optimal sequence of prices and auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    3. Aniko …ry & Ali Horta su & Kevin Williams, 2022. "Dynamic Price Competition: Theory and Evidence from Airline Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2341R1, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2023.
    4. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2020. "Screening for breakthroughs," Papers 2011.10090, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    5. Peter Seele & Claus Dierksmeier & Reto Hofstetter & Mario D. Schultz, 2021. "Mapping the Ethicality of Algorithmic Pricing: A Review of Dynamic and Personalized Pricing," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 170(4), pages 697-719, May.
    6. Gaurab Aryal & Charles Murry & Jonathan W. Williams, 2018. "Price Discrimination in International Airline Markets," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 968, Boston College Department of Economics.
    7. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2023. "Which is better for durable goods producers, exclusive or open supply chain?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 158-176, January.
    8. Ortner, Juan, 2023. "Bargaining with evolving private information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    9. Francesc Dilmé, 2024. "Bargaining with Binary Private Information," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_515, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    10. Emil Temnyalov, 2019. "Points mechanisms and rewards programs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 436-457, June.
    11. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel Garrett, 2022. "A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 191, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    12. Kevin R. Williams, 2022. "The Welfare Effects of Dynamic Pricing: Evidence From Airline Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(2), pages 831-858, March.
    13. Kevin R. Williams, 2017. "Dynamic Airline Pricing and Seat Availability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2103R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2020.
    14. James D. Dana Jr. & Kevin R. Williams, 2018. "This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show the existence of multiple sales opportunities cr," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2136R4, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2021.
    15. Joan Carles Cirer-Costa, 2022. "Qualitative revenue management in sun-and-beach hotels," Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(4), pages 462-469, August.
    16. Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes & Gabriel Y. Weintraub, 2019. "Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 711-730, May.
    17. James D. Dana & Kevin R. Williams, 2022. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Sequential Quantity-Price Games," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(5), pages 966-981, September.
    18. Kevin R. Williams, 2017. "The Welfare Effects of Dynamic Pricing: Evidence from Airline Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2103R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2021.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    revenue management; commitment power; dynamic pricing; flash sales; inattention frictions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2019_083. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CRC Office (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.crctr224.de .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.