The Economics of Collective Brands
We consider the consequences of a shared brand name such as geographical names used to identify high quality products, for the incentives of otherwise autonomous firms to invest in quality. We contend that such collective brand labels improve communication between sellers and consumers, when the scale of production is too small for individual firms to establish reputations on a stand alone basis. This has two opposing effects on member firms’ incentives to invest in quality. On the one hand, it increases investment incentives by increasing the visibility and transparency of individual member firms, which increases the return from investment in quality. On the other hand, it creates an incentive to free ride on the group’s reputation, which can lead to less investment in quality. We identify parmater values under which collective branding delivers higher quality than is achievable by stand alone firms.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: Phone: +972-3-5318345
Web page: http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/ec
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert Evans & Timothy W. Guinnane, 2007.
"Collective Reputation, Professional Regulation and Franchising,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1627, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Robert Evans & Timothy W Guinnane, 2007. "Collective Reputation, Professional Regulation and Franchising," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001563, UCLA Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2010-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Department of Economics)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.