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Collective Reputation, Professional Regulation and Franchising

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Abstract

Collective reputation and its associated free-rider problem have been invoked to justify state licensing of professions and to explain the incidence of franchising. We examine the conditions under which it is possible to create a Pareto-improving collective reputation among groups of heterogeneous producers. If the regulator or franchisor cannot credibly commit to high quality then a common reputation can be created only if the groups are not too different and if marginal cost is declining. High cost groups benefit most from forming a common regime.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Evans & Timothy W. Guinnane, 2007. "Collective Reputation, Professional Regulation and Franchising," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1627, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1627
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    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d16/d1627.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Kolavalli, Shashidhara & Birner, Regina & Flaherty, Kathleen, 2012. "The comprehensive Africa agriculture program as a collective institution:," IFPRI discussion papers 1238, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    2. Stefano Castriota & Marco Delmastro, 2010. "Individual and Collective Reputation: Lessons from the Wine Market," L'industria, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 149-172.
    3. Fishman, Arthur & Finkelshtain, Israel & Simhon, Avi & Yacouel, Nira, 2008. "The Economics of Collective Brands," Discussion Papers 46056, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Agricultural Economics and Management.
    4. Arthur Fishman & Israel Finkelstein & Avi Simhon & Nira Yacouel, 2010. "The Economics of Collective Brands," Working Papers 2010-11, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    5. Alexander E. Saak, 2012. "Collective Reputation, Social Norms, and Participation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(3), pages 763-785.
    6. Peter Gal & Attila Jambor, 2020. "Geographical Indications as Factors of Market Value: Price Premiums and Their Drivers in the Hungarian Off-Trade Wine Market," AGRIS on-line Papers in Economics and Informatics, Czech University of Life Sciences Prague, Faculty of Economics and Management, vol. 12(2), June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Quality regulation; Licensing; Collective reputation; Reputational externality; Franchising;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations

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