Electoral Competition Between Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information
This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.
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- Enriqueta Aragonés & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000.
"Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate,"
Economics Working Papers
502, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 131-161, March.
- Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas. R., 2000. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model With a Favored Candidate," Working Papers 1102, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Enriqueta Aragones & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2002.
"The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
530.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Enriqueta AragonÃ¨s & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2015. "The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 59, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 1138, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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