IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bfi/wpaper/2020-17.html

Political Scandal: A Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Wioletta Dziuda

    (University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy)

  • William G. Howell

    (University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy)

Abstract

We study a model that characterizes the conditions under which past misbehavior becomes the subject of present scandal, with consequences for both the implicated politician and the parties that work with him. In the model, both authentic and fake scandals arise endogenously within a political framework involving two parties that trade off benefits of continued collaboration with a suspect politician against the possibility of reputational fallout. Rising polarization between the two parties, we show, increases the likelihood of scandal while decreasing its informational value. Scandals that are triggered by only the opposing party, we also find, are reputationally damaging to both parties and, in some instances, reputationally enhancing to the politician. The model also reveals that jurisdictions with lots of scandals are not necessarily beset by more misbehavior. Under well-defined conditions, in fact, scandals can be a sign of political piety.

Suggested Citation

  • Wioletta Dziuda & William G. Howell, 2020. "Political Scandal: A Theory," Working Papers 2020-17, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2020-17
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repec.bfi.uchicago.edu/RePEc/pdfs/BFI_WP_202017.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini & Francesco Trebbi, 2003. "Electoral Rules and Corruption," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 958-989, June.
    2. Christopher J. Anderson & Yuliya V. Tverdova, 2003. "Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(1), pages 91-109, January.
    3. Matthew Gentzkow & Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin, 2006. "The Rise of the Fourth Estate. How Newspapers Became Informative and Why It Mattered," NBER Chapters, in: Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's Economic History, pages 187-230, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Nyhan, Brendan & Reifler, Jason, 2015. "Displacing Misinformation about Events: An Experimental Test of Causal Corrections," Journal of Experimental Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 81-93, April.
    5. Timothy Besley & Andrea Prat, 2006. "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 720-736, June.
    6. Nyhan, Brendan, 2015. "Scandal Potential: How Political Context and News Congestion Affect the President's Vulnerability to Media Scandal," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(2), pages 435-466, April.
    7. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2011. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1274-1311, June.
    8. Eggers, Andrew C., 2014. "Partisanship and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from the UK Expenses Scandal," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 9(4), pages 441-472, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wioletta Dziuda & William G. Howell, 2021. "Political Scandal: A Theory," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 197-209, January.
    2. Luc√≠a Mendoza Mora, 2022. "Perceiving bad apples versus rotten trees: Evidence from the exposure of politician misbehavior in Colombia," Documentos CEDE 20515, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    3. Tsur, Yacov, 2022. "Political tenure, term limits and corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    4. Miguel Ángel Borrella Mas, 2015. "Partisan Alignment and Political Corruption. Theory and Evidence from Spain Job Market Paper," Working Papers. Serie AD 2015-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    5. Britto, Diogo G.C. & Fiorin, Stefano, 2020. "Corruption and legislature size: Evidence from Brazil," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    6. Qian, Nancy & Yangagizawa, David, 2010. "Watchdog or Lapdog? Media and the U.S. Government," CEPR Discussion Papers 7684, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2008. "Competition and Truth in the Market for News," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 133-154, Spring.
    8. Armand, Alex & Coutts, Alexander & Vicente, Pedro C. & Vilela, Inês, 2023. "Measuring corruption in the field using behavioral games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    9. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Paulo Henrique Luna, 2021. "Fiscal transparency, legal system and perception of the control on corruption: empirical evidence from panel data," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 60(4), pages 2005-2037, April.
    10. Eugen Dimant & Guglielmo Tosato, 2018. "Causes And Effects Of Corruption: What Has Past Decade'S Empirical Research Taught Us? A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 335-356, April.
    11. Svaleryd, Helena & Vlachos, Jonas, 2009. "Political rents in a non-corrupt democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3-4), pages 355-372, April.
    12. Di Gioacchino, Debora & Verashchagina, Alina, 2020. "Mass media and preferences for redistribution," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    13. Fernando Aragón & Ricardo Pique, 2020. "Better the devil you know? Reelected politicians and policy outcomes under no term limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 1-16, January.
    14. Larcinese, Valentino & Sircar, Indraneel, 2017. "Crime and punishment the British way: Accountability channels following the MPs’ expenses scandal," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 75-99.
    15. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro & Michael Sinkinson, 2011. "The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 2980-3018, December.
    16. Garz, Marcel & Sörensen, Jil, 2017. "Politicians under investigation: The news Media's effect on the likelihood of resignation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 82-91.
    17. Belguise, Margot, 2024. "Red Herrings : A Model of Attention-Hijacking by Politicians," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 86, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    18. Ahlquist, John S. & Ichino, Nahomi & Wittenberg, Jason & Ziblatt, Daniel, 2018. "How do voters perceive changes to the rules of the game? Evidence from the 2014 Hungarian elections," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 906-919.
    19. Vincenzo Alfano & Salvatore Capasso & Lodovico Santoro, 2023. "Corruption and the political system: some evidence from Italian regions," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 9(2), pages 665-695, July.
    20. Blasco, Andrea & Pin, Paolo & Sobbrio, Francesco, 2016. "Paying positive to go negative: Advertisers׳ competition and media reports," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 243-261.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2020-17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Toni Shears The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Toni Shears to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mfichus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.