IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdi/workpa/sec_24.html

The crisis management framework for banks in the EU. How can we deal with the crisis of small and medium-sized banks?

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Veron

    (Bruegel and Peterson Institute)

  • Anna Gelpern

    (Georgetown University)

  • Lynn Shibut

    (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)

  • Marco Bodellini

    (Queen Mary University)

  • Michael Schillig

    (King's College University)

  • Margit Vanberg

    (Bafin)

  • Sven Balder

    (Bafin)

  • Francisco Sotelo

    (Bank of Spain)

  • Jens Verner Andersen

    (Finansiel Stabilitet)

  • Mathias Semay Hovedskov

    (Finansiel Stabilitet)

  • Fernando Restoy

    (Financial Stability Institute)

  • Rastko Vrbaski

    (Financial Stability Institute)

  • Ruth Walters

    (Financial Stability Institute)

Abstract

The volume is a collection of the papers presented at the workshop organized by the Bank of Italy on 'The crisis management framework for banks in the EU - how can we deal with the crisis of small and medium-sized banks?', held online on 15 January 2021.The workshop provided the opportunity to reflect on the possible reforms of EU rules to increase the capacity of the authorities to manage the crises of small and medium-sized banks so as to avoid a destroying-value peicemeal liquidation and the overall costs that it could generate

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Veron & Anna Gelpern & Lynn Shibut & Marco Bodellini & Michael Schillig & Margit Vanberg & Sven Balder & Francisco Sotelo & Jens Verner Andersen & Mathias Semay Hovedskov & Fernando Restoy & R, 2021. "The crisis management framework for banks in the EU. How can we deal with the crisis of small and medium-sized banks?," Workshop and Conferences 24, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdi:workpa:sec_24
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/collana-seminari-convegni/2021-0024/n-24_The_crisis_management_framework_for_banks_in_the_EU.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Park, Sangkyun & Peristiani, Stavros, 1998. "Market Discipline by Thrift Depositors," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 347-364, August.
    2. Troy Davig & Michal Kowalik & Charles S. Morris & Kristen Regehr, 2015. "Bank consolidation and merger activity following the crisis," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q I, pages 31-49.
    3. Rosalind L. Bennett & Mark D. Vaughan & Timothy J. Yeager, 2005. "Should the FDIC worry about the FHLB? The impact of Federal Home Loan Bank advances on the Bank Insurance Fund," Working Paper 05-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    4. Shirley, Mary & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "Public versus private ownership : the current state of the debate," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2420, The World Bank.
    5. J. B. Cooke & Christoffer Koch & Anthony Murphy, 2015. "Liquidity mismatch helps predict bank failure and distress," Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, vol. 10(6), pages 1-4, May.
    6. Christian A. Johnson & Tara N. Rice, 2007. "Assessing a decade of interstate bank branching," Working Paper Series WP-07-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Huberdeau-Reid, David A. & Pennacchi, George G., 2025. "Adverse selection in deposit insurance and government funding following the 2023 banking crisis," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    2. Manasan, Rosario G. & Castel, Cynthia G., 2010. "Improving the Financial Management of Local Economic Enterprises," Discussion Papers DP 2010-25, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
    3. Zhao, Jing & Gao, Yaqin & Zhao, Lijuan, 2024. "How does deposit insurance affect household's risk sensitivity？Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(PB).
    4. Spiegel, Mark M. & Yamori, Nobuyoshi, 2007. "Market price accounting and depositor discipline: The case of Japanese regional banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 769-786, March.
    5. Molyneux, Philip & Upreti, Vineet & Zhou, Tim, 2023. "Depositor market discipline: New evidence from selling failed banks," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    6. Kleimeier - Ros, Stefanie & Qi, Shusen & Sander, H., 2016. "Deposit Insurance in Times of Crises: Safe Haven or Regulatory Arbitrage? (RM/15/026-revised-)," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    7. Ullah, Barkat, 2021. "Does innovation explain the performance gap between privatized and private firms?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    8. Ioannidou, V. & de Dreu, J., 2006. "The Impact of Explicit Deposit Insurance on Market Discipline," Other publications TiSEM 693cfa2c-76f1-4304-872f-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Corbae, Dean & D’Erasmo, Pablo, 2020. "Rising bank concentration," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    10. Kira Boerner, 2004. "The Political Economy of Privatization: Why Do Governments Want Reforms?," Working Papers 2004.106, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    11. María Soledad Martínez-Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2002. "Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.),Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 5, pages 143-174, Central Bank of Chile.
    12. Francesco Lamperti & Antoine Mandel & Mauro Napoletano & Alessandro Sapio & Andrea Roventini & Tomas Balint & Igor Khorenzhenko, 2017. "Taming macroeconomic instability," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-03399574, HAL.
    13. Rajkamal Iyer & Manju Puri & Nicholas Ryan, 2016. "A Tale of Two Runs: Depositor Responses to Bank Solvency Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(6), pages 2687-2726, December.
    14. Megginson, William Leon, 2005. "The Financial Economics of Privatization," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195150629.
    15. Jean-Charles Rochet, 2003. "Réglementation prudentielle et discipline de marché," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 73(4), pages 201-212.
    16. Lamers, Martien, 2015. "Depositor discipline and bank failures in local markets during the financial crisis," Research Report 15007-EEF, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    17. Lukasz Kozlowski, 2018. "The Halo Effect in Banking: Evidence from Local Markets," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 68(5), pages 416-441, October.
    18. Patrick R.P. Heller, 2017. "Doubling down: National oil companies as instruments of risk and reward," WIDER Working Paper Series 081, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    19. Popoyan, Lilit & Napoletano, Mauro & Roventini, Andrea, 2017. "Taming macroeconomic instability: Monetary and macro-prudential policy interactions in an agent-based model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 117-140.
    20. Park, Hyun Woong & Bernardin, Thomas, 2018. "Liquidity, bank runs, and fire sales under local thinking," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 89-102.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdi:workpa:sec_24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bdigvit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.