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Bank Loans for Private and Public Firms in a Credit Crunch


  • Jason Allen
  • Teodora Paligorova


Banks reliance on short-term funding has increased over time. While an effective source of financing in good times, the 2007 financial crisis has exposed the vulnerability of banks and ultimately firms to such a liability structure. The authors show that banks that relied most on wholesale funding were the ones to contract its lending the most during the crisis. Their results suggest that banks propagate liquidity shocks by reducing credit only to a certain type of borrower. Importantly, in the financial crisis banks passed the liquidity shock only to public firms. Furthermore, long-term relationships between firms and banks played an important role during the crisis. Public firms with weak banking relationships pre-crisis experienced a greater credit crunch than other public borrowers.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason Allen & Teodora Paligorova, 2011. "Bank Loans for Private and Public Firms in a Credit Crunch," Staff Working Papers 11-13, Bank of Canada.
  • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:11-13

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Stefania De Mitri & Giorgio Gobbi & Enrico Sette, 2010. "Relationship lending in a financial turmoil," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 772, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    2. Ashcraft, Adam B., 2006. "New Evidence on the Lending Channel," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(3), pages 751-775, April.
    3. Rocco Huang & Lev Ratnovski, 2009. "Why Are Canadian Banks More Resilient?," IMF Working Papers 09/152, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 27-48, Fall.
    5. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    6. Mark T. Leary, 2009. "Bank Loan Supply, Lender Choice, and Corporate Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(3), pages 1143-1185, June.
    7. Galina Hale & João A.C. Santos, 2014. "Do banks propagate debt market shocks?," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 270-310, July.
    8. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    9. Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts, 2008. "How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(5), pages 2085-2121, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. H. Evren Damar & Césaire Meh & Yaz Terajima, 2015. "Effects of Funding Portfolios on the Credit Supply of Canadian Banks," Staff Working Papers 15-10, Bank of Canada.
    2. Davydov, Denis & Vähämaa, Sami, 2013. "Debt source choices and stock market performance of Russian firms during the financial crisis," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 148-159.
    3. Brei, Michael & Schclarek, Alfredo, 2015. "A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 298-307.
    4. Alexander Guarín-López & Ignacio Lozano-Espitia, 2016. "Credit Funding and Banking Fragility: An Empirical Analysis for Emerging Economies," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 014306, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
    5. Brei, Michael & Schclarek, Alfredo, 2013. "Public bank lending in times of crisis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 820-830.

    More about this item


    Financial institutions;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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