On the monotonic core
The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable utility (T.U.-game) is the set formed by all its Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes. In this paper we show that this set always coincides with the core of a certain game associated to the initial game.
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- repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-91573 is not listed on IDEAS
- Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
- Norde, Henk & Reijnierse, Hans, 2002.
"A dual description of the class of games with a population monotonic allocation scheme,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 322-343, November.
- Norde, H.W. & Reijnierse, J.H., 2000. "A Dual Description of the Class of Games with a Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme," Discussion Paper 2000-99, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Moulin, H, 1990. "Cores and Large Cores When Population Varies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 219-32.
- Hans Reijnierse & Jean Derks, 1998. "Note On the core of a collection of coalitions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 451-459.
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