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Pocketing and Deceiving: The Behavior of Agency in a Donor - Delivery Agency - Recipient Organization

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Abstract

This paper presents a simple model to analyze the corrupt behavior of the delivery agency in a donor-delivery agency-recipient organization. Corrupt behavior of the delivery agency can take two forms: (i) “pocketing” or where the delivery agency distributes only a portion of the relief fund to the recipient and keeps the remaining fund to itself, and (ii) “deceiving”, where the delivery agency provides false information to the donor regarding the need of the recipient. We show that both forms of behavior can emerge as equilibrium outcomes in this type of organization. We identify factors that influence such corrupt behaviors and draw some policy implications.

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  • Baoyun Qiao & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Yongsheng Xu, 2006. "Pocketing and Deceiving: The Behavior of Agency in a Donor - Delivery Agency - Recipient Organization," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0613, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0613
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    1. Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1126-1137, September.
    2. David Dollar & Craig Burnside, 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 847-868, September.
    3. Richard Zeckhauser (ed.), 1991. "Strategy and Choice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262240335, December.
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