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How efficient is Joint Decision-Making in the EU? Environmental Policies and the Co-Decision Procedure

Author

Listed:
  • Francisco Torres

    (Departamento de Economia e Gestão Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro)

Abstract

This paper is a first step towards the analysis of the joint decision-making mode of governance in the EU. It argues that such a mode of governance enhances policy effectiveness in the field of environmental policy. This is mainly due to the as yet neglected phenomenon of the interaction between representative institutions at different levels in the European Union that characterises joint decision-making. The European Parliament, as a co-legislator with veto power in the co-decision procedure, has been a crucial organisational actor. Its interactions with other actors such as national parliaments and the Council of Ministers and the European Commission are particular relevant in the building-up of more appropriate and legitimate incentives for the correct implementation of common policies, internalising many externalities. It has also allowed for a more active role of EU national parliaments in the EU legislative process, increasing their leverage vis-à-vis their respective governments as far as European legislation is concerned.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Torres, 2003. "How efficient is Joint Decision-Making in the EU? Environmental Policies and the Co-Decision Procedure," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 05, Departamento de Economia, Gestão e Engenharia Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro.
  • Handle: RePEc:ave:wpaper:052003
    as

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    File URL: https://www.ua.pt/egi/ReadObject.aspx?obj=10989
    File Function: First version, 2003
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Abdul G. Noury & Gérard Roland, 2002. "More power to the European Parliament? [‘Nice try: Should the Treaty of Nice be ratified’?]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 17(35), pages 279-319.
    2. Tsebelis, George, 1994. "The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 128-142, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Ani Matei & Cristina Ciora & Adrian Stelian Dumitru & Reli Ceche, 2019. "Efficiency and Effectiveness of the European Parliament under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-18, September.
    2. Francisco Torres, 2006. "On the efficiency-legitimacy trade-off in EMU," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 36, Departamento de Economia, Gestão e Engenharia Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    European governance; co-decision; policy effectiveness; informal institutions; sustainable development;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • O52 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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