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Complementary Information Sources

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  • Zichang Wang

Abstract

A decision maker may have several information sources available and choose which one to consult only after learning the decision problem she faces. When is one such set of sources uniformly more valuable than another? For unrestricted Bayesian decision problems, we show that the answer can be stated entirely in terms of Blackwell comparisons. Form a tagged mixture by drawing a source independently of the state and revealing both its identity and its signal. One source set is more valuable in every decision problem if and only if each tagged mixture of the second source set is Blackwell dominated by some tagged mixture of the first. The result applies to compact, possibly infinite source sets and general signal spaces. It also has an exact quantitative counterpart: the largest normalized value shortfall is the directed Le Cam deficiency between the source sets' tagged hulls. The analogous program for monotone decision problems reveals a boundary. We call the passage from problem-by-problem source-set superiority to a problem-independent pairwise dominance a lifting. The Blackwell lifting does not extend directly to the Lehmann order: mixing sources that individually satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) need not preserve MLRP, and even when it does, no fixed Lehmann-dominating mixture need exist. Requiring one source to serve a finite bundle of monotone decision problems restores the equivalence.

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  • Zichang Wang, 2026. "Complementary Information Sources," Papers 2609.29066, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2609.29066
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    References listed on IDEAS

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