IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2609.10499.html

Monitoring Hierarchies in Knowledge Production

Author

Listed:
  • Shota Ichihashi
  • Fei Li
  • Dihan Zou

Abstract

We study peer monitoring design in knowledge production. A principal leads agents who work on different but related tasks. By working on their own tasks, agents acquire information that is useful for evaluating their peers' performance. We consider robust contracts under which effort by all agents is the unique rationalizable outcome. The optimal contract induces a hierarchy of monitoring authority: agents easier for the principal to monitor directly are assigned greater authority to evaluate other agents. Task diversity improves information value but weakens peer monitoring. This tension distorts optimal public task assignment toward the principal's core expertise. Confidential random assignment relaxes this distortion by decoupling information production from the perceived monitoring structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Shota Ichihashi & Fei Li & Dihan Zou, 2026. "Monitoring Hierarchies in Knowledge Production," Papers 2609.10499, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2609.10499
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.10499
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arjada Bardhi & Nina Bobkova, 2023. "Local Evidence and Diversity in Minipublics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(9), pages 2451-2508.
    2. Arjada Bardhi & Steven Callander, 2026. "Learning in a Correlated World," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 18(1), pages 391-415, August.
    3. Alchian, Armen A. & Demsetz, Harold, 2005. "Production, information costs and economic organization," RAE - Revista de Administração de Empresas, FGV-EAESP Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo (Brazil), vol. 45(3), July.
    4. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
    5. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    6. Harry Pei & Bruno Strulovici, 2025. "Robust Implementation with Costly Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 92(1), pages 476-505.
    7. Jovanovic, Boyan & Rob, Rafael, 1990. "Long Waves and Short Waves: Growth through Intensive and Extensive Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1391-1409, November.
    8. Umberto Garfagnini & Bruno Strulovici, 2016. "Social Experimentation with Interdependent and Expanding Technologies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(4), pages 1579-1613.
    9. Arjada Bardhi, 2024. "Attributes: Selective Learning and Influence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(2), pages 311-353, March.
    10. Marina Halac & Elliot Lipnowski & Daniel Rappoport, 2021. "Rank Uncertainty in Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(3), pages 757-786, March.
    11. David Rahman & Ichiro Obara, 2010. "Mediated Partnerships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 285-308, January.
    12. Matteo Camboni & Michael Porcellacchia, 2025. "Monitoring Team Members: Information Waste and the Transparency Trap," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 324-368, August.
    13. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    14. Steven Callander, 2011. "Searching and Learning by Trial and Error," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2277-2308, October.
    15. Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October.
    16. Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1993. "Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(3), pages 599-611.
    17. Bardhi, Arjada & Callander, Steven, 2026. "Learning in a Correlated World," CEPR Discussion Papers 21351, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    18. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christoph Carnehl & Johannes Schneider, 2025. "A Quest for Knowledge," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(2), pages 623-659, March.
    2. Martino Banchio & Suraj Malladi, 2025. "Rediscovery," Papers 2504.19761, arXiv.org.
    3. Dong, Miaomiao & Mayskaya, Tatiana, 2024. "Does reducing communication barriers promote diversity?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    4. Arjada Bardhi, 2024. "Attributes: Selective Learning and Influence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(2), pages 311-353, March.
    5. Gershkov, Alex & Li, Jianpei & Schweinzer, Paul, 2016. "How to share it out: The value of information in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 261-304.
    6. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Rationalizable Implementation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 11, pages 375-404, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Full implementation in backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 71-76.
    8. Emilio Bisetti & Benjamin Tengelsen & Ariel Zetlin‐Jones, 2022. "Moral Hazard In Remote Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1595-1623, November.
    9. Cooper Howes & Can Urgun & Mark Whitmeyer, 2026. "Delusions of Grandeur and Their Benefits (and Hazards)," Papers 2606.02306, arXiv.org.
    10. Doruk Cetemen & Can Urgun & Leeat Yariv, 2023. "Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(9), pages 2402-2450.
    11. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi & Antonio Penta, 2024. "Strategically robust implementation," Economics Working Papers 1893, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    12. Can Urgun & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Retrospective Search: Exploration and Ambition on Uncharted Terrain," Working Papers 2021-33, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    13. Caleb Koch, 2020. "Implementation with ex post hidden actions," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 5(1), pages 1-35, December.
    14. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2014. "Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure," Working Papers 064-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    15. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi & Antonio Penta, 2024. "Strategically Robust Implementation," Working Papers 1461, Barcelona School of Economics.
    16. Ozerturk, Saltuk & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2025. "Who gets the credit? Credit attribution, spillovers, and inefficiency in teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 246-266.
    17. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2019. "Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 1326-1344, November.
    18. Jain, Ritesh, 2021. "Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 47-66.
    19. Nobel Prize Committee, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    20. Victor H. Aguiar & Per Hjertstrand & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies," Working Papers 2020-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2609.10499. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.