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A Simple Method for School Choice Lotteries

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  • Yasunori Okumura

Abstract

This note proposes a simple polynomial-time method for constructing an ex ante stable school-choice lottery satisfying equal treatment of equals (ETE). We show that the ETE reassignment of any constrained efficient stable matching is ex ante stable, satisfies ETE, and is not ordinally dominated by any other ex ante stable lottery. We further show that there exists a constrained efficient stable matching whose ETE reassignment is not ordinally dominated by any ex post stable lottery.

Suggested Citation

  • Yasunori Okumura, 2026. "A Simple Method for School Choice Lotteries," Papers 2605.06721, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2605.06721
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Haris Aziz & P'eter Bir'o & Gergely Cs'aji & Tom Demeulemeester, 2026. "Smart Lotteries in School Choice: Ex-ante Pareto-Improvement with Ex-post Stability," Papers 2602.10679, arXiv.org.
    2. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348.
    3. Kesten, Onur & Unver, Utku, 2015. "A theory of school choice lotteries," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    4. Onur Kesten & Morimitsu Kurino & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2017. "Efficient lottery design," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 31-57, January.
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