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Private Credit Markets Theory, Evidence, and Emerging Frontiers

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  • Jiacheng Zou

Abstract

Private credit assets under management grew from \$158 billion in 2010 to nearly \$2 trillion globally by mid-2024, fundamentally reshaping corporate credit markets. This paper provides a systematic survey of the academic literature on private credit, organizing theory and evidence around four questions: why the market has grown so rapidly, how direct lender technology differs from bank lending, what risk-adjusted returns investors earn, and whether the sector poses systemic risks. We develop an integrated theoretical framework linking delegated monitoring, soft-information processing, and incomplete contracting to the institutional specifics of modern direct lending. The empirical evidence documents a distinctive lending technology serving opaque, private-equity-sponsored borrowers at a meaningful and persistent spread premium over the broadly syndicated loan market, while performance evidence suggests that risk-adjusted returns for the average fund are largely consumed by fees.

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  • Jiacheng Zou, 2026. "Private Credit Markets Theory, Evidence, and Emerging Frontiers," Papers 2603.14491, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2603.14491
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    References listed on IDEAS

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