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BallotRank: A Condorcet Completion Method for Graphs

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  • Jason Douglas Todd
  • Ismar Volic

Abstract

We introduce BallotRank, a ranked preference aggregation method derived from a modified PageRank algorithm. It is a Condorcet-consistent method without damping, and empirical examination of nearly 2,000 ranked choice elections and over 20,000 internet polls confirms that BallotRank always identifies the Condorcet winner at conventional values of the damping parameter. We also prove that the method satisfies many of the same social choice criteria as other well-known Condorcet completion methods, but it has the advantage of being a natural social welfare function that provides a full ranking of the candidates.

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  • Jason Douglas Todd & Ismar Volic, 2026. "BallotRank: A Condorcet Completion Method for Graphs," Papers 2601.14015, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2601.14015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
    4. Sahand Negahban & Sewoong Oh & Devavrat Shah, 2017. "Rank Centrality: Ranking from Pairwise Comparisons," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 266-287, February.
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    7. Nathan Atkinson & Scott C. Ganz & Dorit S. Hochbaum & James B. Orlin, 2023. "The Strong Maximum Circulation Algorithm: A New Method for Aggregating Preference Rankings," Papers 2307.15702, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2025.
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