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A Note on the Strategic Vulnerability of the Boston Mechanism in Random Markets

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  • Josue Ortega

Abstract

We provide the first asymptotic analysis of the Boston Mechanism under equilibrium play in random markets. We provide two results. First, while 63\% of students receive their first preference under truthful reporting-outperforming any other known mechanism in the literature-this rate converges to zero in any Nash equilibrium of the corresponding preference revelation game as the market size grows. Second, we show there exists a Nash equilibrium where the average student receives a dramatically inferior assignment: in markets with 1,000 students, the average placement shifts from the 7th choice (under truthfulness) to the 145th choice, representing a change from logarithmic to nearly linear average rank.

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  • Josue Ortega, 2025. "A Note on the Strategic Vulnerability of the Boston Mechanism in Random Markets," Papers 2506.19450, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2506.19450
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Itai Ashlagi & Yash Kanoria & Jacob D. Leshno, 2017. "Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(1), pages 69-98.
    2. repec:inm:orstsy:v:13:y:2023:i:2:p:247-270 is not listed on IDEAS
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