Inference in Auctions with Many Bidders Using Transaction Prices
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- Emmanuel Guerre & Yao Luo, 2019. "Nonparametric Identification of First-Price Auction with Unobserved Competition: A Density Discontinuity Framework," Papers 1908.05476, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2023-12-18 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ECM-2023-12-18 (Econometrics)
- NEP-GTH-2023-12-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-UPT-2023-12-18 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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