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Persuasion in Veto Bargaining

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Listed:
  • Jenny S Kim
  • Kyungmin Kim
  • Richard Van Weelden

Abstract

We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We fully characterize the optimal proposal and experiment when Vetoer has quadratic loss, and show that the proposer-optimal can be achieved either by providing no information or with a simple binary experiment. Proposer chooses to reveal partial information when there is sufficient expected misalignment with Vetoer. In this case the opportunity to engage in persuasion strictly benefits Proposer and increases the scope to exercise agenda power.

Suggested Citation

  • Jenny S Kim & Kyungmin Kim & Richard Van Weelden, 2023. "Persuasion in Veto Bargaining," Papers 2310.13148, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2310.13148
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    References listed on IDEAS

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