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The Politics of (No) Compromise: Information Acquisition, Policy Discretion, and Reputation

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  • Liqun Liu

Abstract

Precise information is essential for making good policies, especially those regarding reform decisions. However, decision-makers may hesitate to gather such information if certain decisions could have negative impacts on their future careers. We model how decision-makers with career concerns may acquire policy-relevant information and carry out reform decisions when their policy discretion can be limited ex ante. Typically, decision-makers with career concerns have weaker incentives to acquire information compared to decision-makers without such concerns. In this context, we demonstrate that the public can encourage information acquisition by eliminating either the "moderate policy" or the status quo from decision-makers' discretion. We also analyze when reform decisions should be strategically delegated to decision-makers with or without career concerns.

Suggested Citation

  • Liqun Liu, 2021. "The Politics of (No) Compromise: Information Acquisition, Policy Discretion, and Reputation," Papers 2111.00522, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2111.00522
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    References listed on IDEAS

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